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LAWYER CONDUCT IN THE "TOBACCO WARS"
Roger C. Cramton*
INTRODUCTION
My assignment is to comment briefly on the Redish' and Green2
articles that discuss the conduct of the corporate defense lawyers who
provided counseling, strategic advice, and litigation defense to the to-
bacco companies throughout the years during which it became appar-
ent that their products were related to the injuries and deaths of
millions of people. In addition, I have some equally brief comments
on a subject the articles do not address: the ethical conduct of some of
the plaintiffs' lawyers who were major participants in the "Tobacco
Wars."
II. THE CONDUCT OF THE TOBACCO LAWYERS
The Redish and Green articles do not deal with one set of charges
against the tobacco companies' lawyers: strategic and abusive litiga-
tion conduct designed to delay trials, obstruct discovery of relevant
documents, and run up the costs of the plaintiffs' lawyers who finance
these cases. It is clear that the companies and their lawyers adopted
and continue to follow a deliberate strategy in individual smoker cases
of resisting discovery, rarely settling, and appealing every adverse de-
cision. 3 Nor is there any doubt that the companies and their lawyers
have pursued scorched-earth litigation tactics. In the mid-1980s, an
R.J. Reynolds lawyer boasted to a shareholder audience about his suc-
cess in forcing ten California smoking victims to dismiss their cases
voluntarily:
* Roger C. Cramton is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law
School.
1. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory and the Constitutional Rule of
Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (2001).
2. Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading The Cigarette Papers:
Has the "Wise Counselor" Given Way to the "Hired Gun"?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407 (2001).
3. See RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 18-30 (1996). For further discussion of tobacco companies'
litigation strategies, see Patricia Bellew Gray, Tobacco Firms Defend Smoker Liability Suits with
Heavy Artillery, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1987, at 1; Alison Frankel, Was Budd Lamer Another
Smoking Victim?, N.J.L.J., July 12, 1993.
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[T]he aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and
discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely bur-
densome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly sole
practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these
cases was not by spending all of Reynolds' money, but by making
the other son of a bitch spend all of his. 4
An unsophisticated layperson might view this statement as admit-
ting abusive litigation conduct, such as running up the other side's
costs in a successful effort to defeat a claim. Those more familiar with
the codes governing lawyers and the practice of disciplinary bodies
know that excessive adversary zeal almost never results in lawyer dis-
cipline. 5 The professional rules that deal with matters such as delay, 6
frivolous assertions, 7 discovery abuse,8 and harassment of adverse par-
ties or witnesses are cast in general terms and contain qualifying lan-
guage that make them largely meaningless for purposes of
professional discipline. 9 The organized bar opposes efforts to clarify
the rules, which is clearly a difficult task, and usually opposes proce-
dural rules, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that give judges greater authority to sanction such conduct as it arises
in litigation.' 0 If lawyers for tobacco defendants have crossed the line
in civil litigation, the only likely remedy is a sanction in a specific pro-
ceeding. I know of no study that reports whether or not the tobacco
lawyers have been sanctioned in cases involving smokers or, if so,
whether the frequency is any greater than that of defense lawyers in
other fields of high-stakes product liability litigation.
Now I turn to the topic discussed in the Redish and Green articles:
Did the tobacco lawyers engage in professional misconduct by aiding
and abetting their clients' criminal or fraudulent conduct? To con-
4. See NADER & SMrrH, supra note 3, at 27.
5. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND
E-rHics OF LAWYERING 382-387, 404-431 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing professional rules and atti-
tudes toward excessive adversary zeal, resulting in little or no professional discipline; the un-
availability of tort remedies for abusive litigation conduct; and the development of sanctions in
judicial proceedings as the principal current remedy).
6. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULES] R. 3.2 (1983)
(prohibiting delaying tactics unless "consistent with the interests of the client").
7. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 6, R. 3.1 (stating that an assertion is not prohibited
"unless there is [no] basis [for its assertion] that is not frivolous"; further, comment 2 states that
the lawyer has no duty to make a full inquiry about underlying facts before making the
assertion).
8. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 6, R. 3.4(d) (prohibiting a "frivolous discovery request
or fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request
by an opposing party").
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 6, R. 4.4 (prohibiting harassing tactics "that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person").
10. FEIr. R. Civ. P. 11.
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clude that they did requires evidence establishing: (1) the tobacco
companies at some point in time were engaged in a criminal or fraud-
ulent conspiracy to deceive smokers, the public, and government
agencies concerning the health hazards of tobacco products; (2) the
lawyers knew that the companies were engaged in this wrongful con-
duct; and (3) the lawyers did one or more acts that substantially facili-
tated the fraud.11
Elihu Root who said that "[a]bout half the practice of a decent law-
yer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and
should stop" 12 also contributed another well-known saying to the pro-
fession's lore: "The client never wants to be told he can't do what he
wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the lawyer's job
to tell him how.' 3 The unremarkable conclusion of the Redish and
Green articles is that the tobacco lawyers followed the second course
rather than the first. The more unusual conclusion of the two articles
is that, in the Redish version, the tobacco lawyers were doing what the
Constitution encourages them to do, and, in the Green version, that it
is not clear that the lawyers violated any professional rules or other
law in taking an aggressive "hired gun" posture in representing the
tobacco companies.
Three normative formulations of a lawyer's duty have contended
for the profession's allegiance. First, Samuel Johnson's ipse dixit of
long ago is often referred to today as the "total commitment to client"
model of representation: "A lawyer should do everything (other than
advising or assisting criminal or fraudulent conduct) that the client
would do if the client had the lawyer's knowledge and skill."' 14 Sec-
ond, the profession's current publicly stated norm: "A lawyer may, but
need not, do for the client anything unfair, unconscionable or over-
11. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.C. 1978). This was a
leading case setting out the tripartite standard for aiding and abetting a client's fraud. See also,
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Client Go in Assisting a Client in Unlawful Conduct?, 35
U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981) (spelling out the tripartite test for whether a lawyer's conduct may
lead to civil or criminal liability).
12. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 37 (1994) (quoting Elihu Root).
13. Id. at 76.
14. This is an abbreviated version of Samuel Johnson's Eighteenth Century statement:
A lawyer is to do for his client all that his client might fairly do for himself, if he could.
If, by a superiority of attention, of knowledge, of skill, and a better method of commu-
nication, he has the advantage of his adversary, it is an advantage to which he is
entitled.
JAMES BOSWELL, THE JOURNAL OF A TOUR TO THE HEBRIDES WITH SAMUEL JOHNSON 34-35
(Norton ed., 1955).
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reaching, even if not unlawful."' 5 Finally, Professor Lon Fuller's 1953
statement of a lawyer's responsibilities, embodying the "wise coun-
selor" image: "A lawyer must not do for the client anything unfair,
unconscionable, or overreaching, even if not unlawful.' 6
Redish appears to adopt, or at least defend, total commitment to
client norm; his emphasis on constitutional principles suggests that
this model is required and not merely permissive. Green recognizes
that the "hired gun" role is not obligatory, but speculates that it has
become everyday practice, at least in high-stakes matters. But Green
does not outline a normative view of the lawyer's duty to clients, third
persons, and courts to which individual lawyers should aspire or the
profession seeks to bring about. His concluding paragraph suggests
that the organized profession should consider reining in the "hired
gun," but does not outline steps by which this might be
accomplished.' 7
15. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 673, 679, 685 (1978). My statement is a summary of ABA Ethical Consideration 7-8,
which reads as follows:
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might
result from assertion of legally permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the
lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not
for himself. In the event that the client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a
course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not
prohibited by the Disciplinary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employment.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981). The Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct permit a lawyer to adopt this norm of representation. Rule 2.1 requires a lawyer to "exer-
cise independent professional judgment and render candid advice" and permits advice on
"moral, economic, social and political factors." MODEL RULES, supra note 6. Rule 1.2(c) per-
mits the lawyer, with the client's consent, to "limit the objectives of the representation." Id.
Rule 1.16(b)(3) permits a lawyer to withdraw, even if the client will be materially adversely
affected, if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or
imprudent." Id.
16. This is my summary of a longer statement:
The reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do
not grant any license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of conduct
that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality. In saving himself from this unworthy
involvement, the lawyer cannot be guided solely by an unreflective inner sense of good
faith; he must be at pains to preserve a sufficient detachment from his client's interests
so that he remains capable of a sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what
his client proposes to do.
ABA-AALS Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional Responsibility: Re-
port of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (a statement prepared by a joint
committee of the ABA and the AALS, and Professor Lon Fuller of Harvard is said to be the
principal author). See Schwartz, supra note 15.
17. See Green, supra note 2, at 433.
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Both authors implicitly concede that the tobacco lawyers may be
subject to moral criticism for their conduct, even if they conformed to
the profession's minimal norms and did not assist crime or fraud.
Redish and Green reach this conclusion on the basis of limited facts
concerning the actual representation provided. Whether a particular
activity involves a crime or a fraud on the part of a principal and
whether agents aided or abetted that fraud are issues totally con-
trolled by the underlying facts. I wish that they had explored the
available documentary evidence bearing on these two questions. But
even under the handicap of inadequate facts, it is worthwhile to stress
the risks that lawyers run when the "hired gun" model takes them
repeatedly to the edge of what is legally permissible. Moreover, nor-
mative concern about repetitive behavior of this kind is appropriate
because routinely going to the edge of what is permissible runs the
risk of occasionally going over the edge. 18
My own view is that we know enough about the conduct of at least
some of these lawyers to conclude that their conduct was morally ob-
jectionable. But a more detailed examination of the immense docu-
mentary record that has come to light since 1995 is necessary to reach
an objective conclusion whether they aided and abetted a client's
criminal fraud. The two articles do not provide such an examination,
although Green provides a partial one.
A. The Redish Article
Redish's article, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory and the
Constitutional Role of Self Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, ad-
dresses "hypothetical contingencies of conceivable ... attorney behav-
ior [by lawyers representing the major tobacco companies] during that
period." 19 As its title indicates, the article explores arguments of po-
litical and social theorists concerning the adversary system broadly
viewed as encompassing public debate, as well as adversary litigation.
The article responds to criticisms that adversary representation by
lawyers in these arenas harms the public interest by pursuing narrow
self-interest, hindering the search for truth, and encouraging social
conflict. Redish argues that our constitutional democratic system, es-
18. The study of abusive litigation behavior by large firm lawyers in high-stakes cases suggests
a legal culture in these firms that leads lawyers to go to the edge, and sometimes beyond, in
handling discovery requests. See ABA Section of Litigation's Special Task Force, Report, Ethics:
Beyond the Rules, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 691-895 (1998) (especially note the preface and
editorial introduction, outlining the study and summarizing its results; the individual papers by
six scholars provide a great deal of informative detail and surmise).
19. See Redish, supra note 1, at 360 n.l.
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pecially the right of free expression and procedural due process, sup-
ports his view of "liberal democratic adversary theory" rather than the
more traditional "pluralistic adversary theory. '20
This highly abstract theorizing about "adversary theory and the
Constitution" clearly supports a right of interested persons and orga-
nizations to utilize the services of lawyers, as well as other profession-
als, in advancing their interests and their right to diligent and
committed representation by a lawyer in public proceedings. Al-
though moral arguments can be made against this conclusion, surely
these representational rights are part and parcel of our current under-
standing of lawyers' function in society and within the adversary sys-
tem. So it is not surprising that Redish concludes a lawyer may
promote a client's objectives "within the bounds of the law."'2'
Redish states conclusions that parallel the codes governing lawyer
conduct but expresses them in somewhat differing language: lawyers
may assist clients in a course of conduct that may be viewed as morally
objectionable, providing the conduct is not criminal or fraudulent; and
they may make arguments and devise strategies that put facts and law
most favorably to the client as long as they do not knowingly assist a
client's crime or fraud.22 The lawyer's own personal beliefs at various
times as to whether the client's product causes harm or whether con-
sumers are aware of the severity of the possible harm are irrelevant; if
the lawyer in good conscience is unable to take lawful steps that
would further the client's interests, the lawyer should resign from the
representation.
I am left with several disappointments. First, the pages that discuss,
in general fashion, the application of these principles to the lawyers
representing the tobacco companies during 1953-1971 deal with hypo-
thetical circumstances rather than the much more detailed factual pic-
ture that has emerged since 1994.23 Redish essentially defends the
tobacco lawyers' conduct, conceding only that if false representations
were made would misconduct have occurred. With respect to the
"special projects" in which research decisions were made directly by
the lawyers, he states only that "any detailed discussion of the nature
20. Id. at 368-371.
21. This is a phrase used in the MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, but not mentioned
by Redish.
22. Redish does not make it clear that "fraud" includes material statements that mislead by
omission as well as affirmative falsehoods, nor that the required intent is satisfied by "willful
blindness" and by reckless disregard of whether statements that are made are true or false. See
HAZARD, KONIAK AND CRAMTON, supra note 5, at 104-122, 289-303 (discussing the elements of
aiding and abetting a client's fraud, including intent).
23. See Redish, supra note 1 at 395-405.
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of these projects would require considerably more focus on the facts
than I consider helpful or appropriate for what is primarily a theoreti-
cal analysis."'24 But judgments about the conduct can only be made on
the basis of a full understanding of the facts.
Second, the failure to consider representation during the period
1971-1998 is puzzling, because documentary evidence concerning the
conduct of the tobacco companies and their lawyers only became pub-
lic beginning in 1990.25 This was a period in which it was plausible to
assume much greater knowledge on the part of the industry's lawyers
concerning the causal relationship between smoking and various dis-
eases, the addictive quality of nicotine, and other issues relating to
whether the tobacco companies were engaged in fraudulent deception
of the public and in making false statements to public bodies. Perhaps
Redish's role as an expert witness for the companies on lawyer con-
duct has given him confidential information relating to the later pe-
riod, requiring his "hypothetical facts" approach to be limited to the
earlier period of representation.
Finally, Redish's article, by failing to address the moral question of
whether a good lawyer should have withdrawn at some point from
representing the tobacco companies, suggests that moral criticism of
the choices lawyers make in undertaking and continuing representa-
tion of wealthy corporate clients is inappropriate. I disagree. Al-
though lawyers do not adopt the views or values of their clients by
representing them, the decisions they make in choosing clients and
continuing representation are subject to moral criticism except in situ-
ations not involved here, such as the lawyer appointed to represent an
indigent defendant or one representing an unpopular defendant seek-
ing the assistance of "the last lawyer in town."' 26
B. The Green Article
Green's article, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading
The Cigarette Papers: Has the "Wise Counselor" Given Way to the
24. Id. at 401 n.151.
25. The initial disclosure was in the trial court decision of Judge Sovokin in Cippollare v.
Ligget Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sovokin's ruling applying the crime
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and summarizing lawyer involvement in research
decisions). Subsequently, some thirty million pages of documents were produced in the exten-
sive discovery in Minnesota. The factual allegations of the state complaints in Minnesota and
Wisconsin provide a summary of this evidence, but clearly a partisan one.
26. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 569-578 (1986) (discussing the law-
yer's detachment from the views and actions of the client; the professional freedom to choose
clients; and the moral obligation to assist in the provision of representation for indigent and
unpopular clients and to accept court appointments). See also MODEL RULES, supra note 6, R.
1.2(b) (discussing scope of representation of the client).
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"Hired Gun"?,27 provides more factual detail on the tobacco lawyers'
behavior and an affirmative answer to the question it poses. Whether
or not the wise business counselor of the past really existed, the case
study of the representation of the tobacco companies provided by
Glantz's 1996 book, The Cigarette Papers, based on Brown & William-
son documents leaked to Glantz in 1994, indicates that these lawyers
provided zealous representation untempered by moral advice and
concerns for public responsibility.2 8 Green suggests that advocacy to
the limits of the law is now the standard in corporate representation:
the "wise counselor" has been replaced by the "hired gun."
Although "The Cigarette Papers portray corporate lawyers playing a
pervasive, long-term and critically important part in 'protecting [the
tobacco industry's] ability to market an addictive product that kills its
customers in epidemic numbers,'"29 Green, like Redish, concludes it
is unclear that these lawyers "knowingly assisted B&W in criminal or
fraudulent conduct" or in conduct that was necessarily tortious. 30 Al-
though the company's public relations campaign was deceptive, "it is
far from clear that this was actionable fraud and that the lawyers knew
at the time that it was actionable fraud."'3' The bogus claim of attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product immunity for unfavorable re-
search results and the destruction or shipment overseas of damaging
documents may have been morally objectionable, but it may not have
been criminal. In short, the current codes governing lawyers permit a
lawyer to assist a client in immoral and objectionable actions so long
as the lawyer does not counsel or assist criminal or fraudulent
conduct.
Green is correct in his statement of the current limits on lawyers'
conduct and may be right in suggesting that current corporate practice
tends to push advocacy to the limits. But he fails to consider the risks
that lawyers take in pushing things to the limit. Civil and criminal
liability, rather than professional discipline, are the more likely risks
faced by lawyers who are thought to have assisted commercial fraud.
Green's emphasis on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct gives a somewhat skewed picture of the rules that are actually
applicable to lawyer conduct. The rules that govern false statements
and fraudulent conduct in the vast majority of states are more de-
manding and explicit than the ABA Model Rules because they
27. See Green, supra note 2.
28. STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARE17E PAPERS (1996).
29. See Green, supra note 2, at 436.
30. Id. at 426.
31. Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 51:435
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broaden the limited exceptions to confidentiality stated in ABA
Model Rule 1.6.32 According to an analysis of state codes by the At-
torneys Liability Assurance Society, the leading malpractice insurer of
large U.S. law firms, a lawyer may or must reveal confidential infor-
mation of: (1) a client's intention to commit a future criminal fraud
likely to result in injury to the financial interest or property of another
party (forty-one jurisdictions); (2) a client's prior commission of a
crime or fraud, using the lawyer's services, resulting in injury to the
financial interest or property of another party (eighteen jurisdictions);
and (3) a client's ongoing criminal or fraudulent act (forty-six jurisdic-
tions). 33 Essentially the same positions are taken by the American
Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers34
and the rule changes recently proposed by the ABA's Ethics 2000
Commission.35
The law firms that did Charles Keating's bidding during the savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s argued that they were merely providing
vigorous advocacy; yet their reputations were sullied and their pocket-
books were damaged in subsequent malpractice and third-party liabil-
ity actions.36 Jurors who know, after the fact, that a client has engaged
in fraud, are prone to assume that lawyers who facilitated fraudulent
transactions had a greater knowledge of the client's fraud than per-
haps the lawyers did.37 Although professional discipline does not pose
much of a threat in these situations, civil liability is and should be a
32. See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, R 1.6 (setting forth guidelines for confidentiality of
information).
33. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Memorandum, Ethics Rules on Client
Confidences (2000), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2001 SELECTED
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 134-151 (2001).
34. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERS § 67 (1998) (using or disclosing client information to prevent, rectify, or mitigate substan-
tial financial loss); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 51 (duty of care to certain nonclients).
35. The Commission's proposed amendments to Model Rule 1.6 would permit a lawyer to
disclose confidential client information to prevent or rectify a client crime or fraud reasonably
certain to cause financial injury to a third person in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer's services.
36. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 5, at 739-759 (reprinting In Re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings and Loan Securities Litigation (Jones Day), 794 F. Supp. 1424
(D. Ariz. 1992), and discussing civil liability of law firms for thrift industry representation that
aided and abetted client fraud); see also William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Law-
yer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 241-372 (1998) (including comments by other scholars and a Simon reply).
37. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (applying one of the best-established findings of cognitive psychol-
ogy-the tendency of all human beings to exaggerate the extent to which an event that they know




major concern. Given the solvency and deep pockets of the tobacco
companies, smoking victims have no reason to pursue riskier claims
against the companies' lawyers. But if the tobacco companies were to
become bankrupt, some law firms might find themselves in the posi-
tion of defendants.
Green recognizes that millions of tobacco documents have become
available in addition to the B&W documents leaked to Glantz in
1994.38 Since 1997, a succession of tobacco cases has held that docu-
ments previously protected by the companies' attorney-client privilege
were admissible under the crime-fraud exception. 39 Such a finding
rests on the establishment of a prima facie case that the client has used
the lawyer's services to assist a fraud.40 The determination, however,
usually rests on an assumption that the lawyer did not know that the
client was engaged in the fraud. As indicated earlier, a lawyer is
civilly or criminally liable for client fraud only if it can be established:
(1) the client was engaged in fraudulent conduct; (2) the lawyer at
some point acquired knowledge of the fraud; and (3) the lawyer per-
formed some substantial act or acts that furthered the fraud.41 The
case against the tobacco lawyers, however, cannot be viewed as estab-
lished on the basis of allegations alone; a convincing showing based on
the full record is necessary.
At a 1997 conference on the 1996 global settlement, Professor
Frank Turkheimer, a criminal law expert and former prosecutor, eval-
uated the publicly available information to determine whether the to-
bacco lawyers were guilty of criminal conduct.42 Using the detailed
facts alleged in the civil complaint filed by Wisconsin and assuming
their truthfulness, he concluded that the assumed facts would support
a criminal conspiracy charge under federal law for deliberate and
knowing misrepresentation of smoking hazards to various federal
38. See Michael Ciresi, Panel Discussion on the Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2838 (1999) (stating that thirty-three million documents were produced
in the case after extensive privilege fights).
39. See, e.g., Burton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491 (D. Kan. 1997); American
Tobacco Co. v. State of Florida, 697 So.2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1997); Humphrey v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 1998 WL 257214 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Mar. 7, 1998).
40. For discussion of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, see HAZARD,
KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 5, at 240-254.
41. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 5, 104-122, 289-303 (discussing the ele-
ments of aiding and abetting a client's fraud, including intent).
42. Conference on the So-Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications for Public
Health and Public Policy, Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Law School,
Madison, WI (proceedings of the conference were published and are available). For a conve-
nient summary, see Peter Carstensen, Marc Galanter & Gerald Thain, The So-Called Global
Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications for Public Health and Public Policy-An Executive Summary,
22 So. Ill. U. L.J. 705 (1998).
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agencies and congressional committees. Because of the central role of
lawyers in the industry's wrongdoing, he speculated that they were
also at risk if evidence of requisite knowledge was available.
During 1998 and 1999, a federal grand jury investigation was said to
be considering the conduct of company lawyers. Although no indict-
ments resulted, presumably because prosecutors thought the risks of
conviction problematic, the investigation itself was a cause of concern
to the law firms involved. 43 Since then, a number of smoking victims
have named company lawyers as codefendants in their lawsuits.
In short, without a more elaborate examination of available evi-
dence, it is hazardous to speculate whether the tobacco lawyers did or
did not counsel or assist criminal or fraudulent conduct.
III. CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS
Some of the plaintiffs' firms who are now receiving massive fee pay-
ments under the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, signed by all
states, acted with disregard for the rules governing concurrent con-
flicts of interest in their various representations against the tobacco
companies.44 Several of them, including the Ness Motley firm, relied
on the massive inventory settlements related to two giant asbestos
class actions to fund their move into tobacco litigation.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,45 the Supreme Court held
that intra-class conflicts of interest between currently injured mem-
bers of the class and "futures" 46 required rejection of the class certifi-
cation. Two years later in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,47 the Court's
rejection of the second giant settlement rested on the concurrent con-
flict of interest arising from class counsel's inventory settlements on
different and less favorable terms than those provided in the proposed
class action settlement to future claimants. Ness Motley was class
counsel in both cases, and the decisions implicitly hold that the firm
engaged in simultaneous representation of clients with differing inter-
43. See Milo Geyelin & Ann Davis, Tobacco Foes Target Role of Lawyers, WALL ST.J., Apr.
23, 1998, at B1; Diana Henriques, Tobacco Lawyers' Role Is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
1998, at A18; and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Tobacco Lawyers Shame the Entire Profession, NAT'L
L.J., May 18, 1998, at A22.
44. For discussion of the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, see Hanoch Dagan & James
J. White, Governments, Citizens and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 360-382 (2000),
and W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523 (1999).
45. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
46. In other words, those who would suffer a legal injury in the future as a result of past
exposure.
47. 119 S.Ct. 2295 (1999).
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ests and this conflict impaired the firm's representation of future
claimants.48
Concurrent conflicts of interest continued once these plaintiffs' law-
yers moved into the tobacco field. First, they undertook to represent
some individual smoking victims who were seeking compensatory and
punitive damages against the tobacco companies. 49 Second, after a
failed effort to certify a class including all smoking victims nationwide,
they brought a number of cases involving statewide classes. These
cases also sought both compensatory and punitive damages for smok-
ing victims. Then the plaintiffs' lawyers agreed to represent Missis-
sippi and Florida in reimbursement actions brought by those states
against the tobacco companies. These actions, later expanded to in-
clude twenty-two states, were settled in a June 1997 agreement that
capped the liability of the tobacco companies to smoking victims and,
when implemented by Congress, prohibited punitive damages. 50 The
lawyers abandoned the relief that they were claiming on behalf of in-
dividual claimants in negotiating the global settlement on behalf of
the states. A lawyer violates the concurrent representation conflict of
interest rules when the claims of some clients (smoking victims) are
subordinated to those of other clients (the states).
When Congress proved unwilling to accept the proposed settle-
ment, the plaintiffs' lawyers then negotiated the Master Settlement
Agreement of 1998, which was eventually signed by all states.5' That
agreement provides for payment of about $250 billion to the states
over twenty-five years. The 1998 agreement does not protect the in-
dustry from class actions or punitive damages, or cap their liability to
smoking victims. But the agreement does make the states and their
lawyers co-venturers with the tobacco companies, because the compa-
48. See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, R. 1.7(b): "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client . . . unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected." See also Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (lst Cir. 1987) (disqualifying lawyer
for simultaneously representing two separate classes when defendant's settlement offer with re-
spect to one class created a concurrent conflict of interest with the other class).
49. One such case, Ness Motley's representation of the widow of a Mississippi barber who
died of lung cancer, was widely reported. See Estate of Butler v. Philip Morris, Inc., 94-5-53
(Miss. Cir. Ct., Jones County). See also Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Plaintiff Files Suit Against Her
Ex-Attorney, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1997, at B8; Bob Van Voris, Tobacco Negotiations Created
Sharp Client Conflicts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at A8-A9,. A subsequent story indicated that
Ness Motley entered into a confidential settlement after Ms. Butler brought a $1.5 million dam-
age action against the firm alleging conflict of interest violations. She alleged that the firm did
not inform her of the conflicting interests and she did not consent to them. See NAT'L L.J., Sept.
22, 1997, at A5.
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1996 Global Settlement.
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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nies have to be kept solvent or the goose that lays the golden eggs will
be driven into bankruptcy. Thus far, less than ten percent of the state
reimbursement payments has been devoted to reducing the number of
smokers. 52 And the entire cost of the state payments and the plain-
tiffs' lawyers' fees is being borne by smoking victims through cigarette
price increases in the amount necessary to fund the payments.
Thus, the original clients of the plaintiffs' lawyers-individual
smoking victims-are left with the check for the state payments and
the lawyers' fees. It is ironic that the very claims asserted on their
behalf-that they were poor, deceived about the real hazards of
smoking, and addicted to nicotine-have been answered by placing
the cost of tobacco price increases solely on the addicted victims. Be-
cause smokers are older and poorer than the general population, 53 the
increase, which is essentially a national tax on cigarettes created with-
out any federal legislation, is one of the most regressive in history.
An impermissible conflict of interest occurred when these plaintiffs'
lawyers, without any communication with these individual clients or
even an attempt to withdraw from pending litigation, abandoned
these clients and sought enormous fees for themselves in negotiating
deals on behalf of the states with the same defendants.
52. Michael Janofsky, Tiny Part of Settlement Money Is Spent on Tobacco Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001, at All.
53. Patrick Jamieson & Daniel Romer, A Profile of Smokers & Smoking, in SMOKING-RISK,
PERCEPTION & POLICY 29, 38-39 (Paul Slovic ed.) (discussing demographic data showing, for
example, that adults with only high school diplomas are about three times as likely to be smokers
as are those who have a college degree and the higher income that flows from more education).
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